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 1  Garland ’ s handy neologism encapsulating  ‘ the whole of the penal complex, including its laws, sanctions, insti-
tutions, and practices and its discourses, symbols, rituals, and performances ’ . See  D  Garland ,  ‘ Penality and the 
Penal State ’ ( 2013 )  51  Criminology  475 ;  D  Garland ,  Punishment and Modern Society ( Oxford ,  Clarendon Press , 
 1990 ) . 
 2  The natural break between criminal process and the penal system is institutionally reinforced in common law 
jurisdictions, inasmuch as common law courts do not supervise the imposition of punishment (beyond generic 
powers of judicial review applicable to all administrative exercises of public power) in the direct way that, for 
example, German courts do. See  M  Bohlander ,  Principles of German Criminal Procedure ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing , 
 2012 ) ch 7. 
 Introduction: Re-examining 
Criminal Process Through the 
Lens of Integrity 
 PAUL  ROBERTS ,  JILL  HUNTER ,  SIMON  NM  YOUNG AND  DAVID  DIXON 
 1. Methodological Integrity 
 This book explores the relationship between integrity and criminal process. By  ‘ criminal 
process ’ we mean, roughly speaking, the institutions, procedures and practices constituting 
offi cial responses to suspected criminal wrongdoing, encompassing criminal investigations, 
prosecutions, trials, appeals and extraordinary post-conviction procedures. We do not 
extend our analysis to  ‘ the penal system ’ and the treatment of convicted offenders, largely on 
pragmatic rather than theoretical grounds. The book ’ s central thesis is that  ‘ integrity ’ offers 
a powerful conceptual lens through which the criminal process in its entirety, or selected 
phases or aspects of it, can be viewed and critically re-examined. Our general approach 
could in principle be extended to penality 1 at large, but we had to stop somewhere to keep 
the volume within reasonable bounds, and adjudication marks a natural temporal break-
point, distinguishing the participation of suspects, victims, witnesses and the accused in 
the investigative process and at trial from the treatment of convicted offenders in the penal 
system. 2 
 This study is properly characterised as exploratory for at least two, mutually reinforcing 
reasons. First, as a themed collection of essays by 17 authors, each with their own theoreti-
cal preferences and perspectives, the analyses, discussions and arguments presented in the 
following chapters are necessarily somewhat open-ended, idiosyncratic and disputatious. 
More fundamentally, however, the juxtaposition between integrity and criminal process 
is relatively novel and unexamined. To the best of our knowledge, this is the fi rst work to 
attempt anything like a systematic exploration. With this in mind, our primary objective in 
breaking new conceptual ground is to stimulate further discussion and critical refl ection, 
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 3  See  RA  Duff ,  ‘ Retributive Punishment — Ideals and Actualities ’ ( 1991 )  25  Israel Law Review  422 . 
 4  HL  Packer ,  ‘ Two Models of the Criminal Process ’ ( 1964 )  113  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  1 ; 
 HL  Packer ,  The Limits of the Criminal Sanction ( Palo Alto CA ,  Stanford University Press ,  1969 ) . 
 5  Prominently including  MR  Dama š ka ,  The Faces of Justice and State Authority ( New Haven CT ,  Yale  University 
Press ,  1986 ) . See further,  P  Roberts ,  ‘ Faces of Justice Adrift ? Dama š ka ’ s Comparative Method and the Future 
of Common Law Evidence ’ in  J  Jackson ,  M  Langer and  P  Tillers (eds),  Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a 
Comparative and International Context ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2008 ) ;  A  Ashworth and  M  Redmayne ,  The 
Criminal  Process ,  4th edn ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2010 ) chs 1 – 3;  A  Sanders ,  R  Young and  M  Burton , 
 Criminal Justice ,  4th edn ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2010 ) ch 1;  N  Lacey ,  ‘ Making Sense of Criminal Justice ’ 
in  N  Lacey (ed),  A Reader on Criminal Justice ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  1994 ) . 
 6  LE  Chiesa ,  ‘ Comparative Criminal Law ’ in  MD  Dubber and  T  H ö rnle (eds),  The Oxford Handbook of Criminal 
Law ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2014 ) . 
 7  M Langer,  ‘ The Long Shadow of the Adversarial and Inquisitorial Categories ’ in Dubber and H ö rnle, ibid; 
 S  Field ,  ‘ Fair Trials and Procedural Traditions in Europe ’ ( 2009 )  29  Oxford Journal of Legal Studies  365 ;  J  McEwan , 
 ‘ Ritual, Fairness and Truth :  The Adversarial and Inquisitorial Models of Criminal Trial ’ in  A  Duff ,  L  Farmer , 
 S  Marshall and  V  Tadros (eds),  The Trial on Trial Volume I:  Truth and Due Process ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing , 
 2004 ) . For imaginative metaphorical extensions, see E Grande,  ‘ Dances of Criminal Justice: Thoughts on Systemic 
 Differences and the Search for the Truth ’ ; and R Lempert,  ‘ Anglo-American and Continental Systems: Marsupials 
and Mammals of the Law ’ , both in Jackson et al (eds), above n 5;  WT  Pizzi ,  ‘ Soccer, Football and Trial Systems ’ 
( 1995 )  1  Columbia Journal of European Law  369 . 
 8  HP  Glenn ,  ‘ Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions ’ in  M  Reimann and 
 R  Zimmermann (eds),  The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2006 ) ; 
 K  Zweigert and  H  K ö tz ,  An Introduction to Comparative Law ,  3rd edn ,  T  Weir trans ( Oxford ,  Oxford University 
Press ,  1998 ) Part I. 
rather than purporting to supply the last word on the topic — as preposterous as that would 
be, given the complexity and richness of our subject-matter. The pluralistic, open-ended, 
productively argumentative format of an edited collection is eminently well suited to these 
programmatic objectives. 
 Our methodology is also pluralistic in a second, more theoretical sense. Surveying exist-
ing disciplinary literatures, and trying to begin without too many theoretical stipulations 
or preconceptions, there are many different ways and means in which one could conceiv-
ably attempt to conceptualise, analyse and debate criminal process. Some approaches are 
purely descriptive, empirical or more broadly factual, whilst others adopt avowedly nor-
mative,  idealistic, 3 moral or political perspectives. Many accounts blend descriptive and 
normative elements with varying levels of clarity and illumination (not all of them are 
optimally explicit about which element of their account is which). Criminal process is 
often conceptualised holistically in terms of one or more comprehensive  ‘ models ’ . Herbert 
 Packer ’ s  ‘ due process ’ and  ‘ crime control ’ dyad is perhaps the most celebrated and infl uen-
tial process model in the Anglo-American literature, 4 but there are many other alternatives 
and  variations. 5 Process modelling is continuously updated to accommodate signifi cant 
developments in criminal justice policy and practice, as we see, for example, in the fairly 
recent emergence of a  ‘ human rights model ’ of criminal process — a conceptualisation that 
would never have occurred to criminal law theorists of Packer ’ s vintage. Comparative per-
spectives introduce further layers of complexity and sophistication in conceptual model-
ling. In substantive law (including criminal law), comparative lawyers routinely distinguish 
 ‘ common law ’ from civilian or Romanist jurisprudence, concepts and approaches, treating 
jurisdiction and institutional history as their touchstones. 6 In criminal procedure, the more 
familiar contrast is between  ‘ adversarial ’ and  ‘ inquisitorial ’ systems. 7 Each of these primary 
comparative vectors can be manipulated and worked up into more sophisticated  theories, 
for example by populating the globe with multiple  ‘ families of law ’ 8 or by  combining 
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 9  See eg  J  Jackson and  S  Summers ,  The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge 
 University Press ,  2012 ) ;  JJ  Capowski ,  ‘ China ’ s Evidentiary and Procedural Reforms, the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
and the Harmonization of Civil and Common Law ’ ( 2012 )  47  Texas International Law Journal  455 ;  B  Yin and 
 P  Duff ,  ‘ Criminal Procedure in Contemporary China :  Socialist, Civilian or Traditional ? ’ ( 2010 )  59  International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly  1099 ;  P  Roberts ,  ‘ Comparative Criminal Justice Goes Global ’ ( 2008 )  28  Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies  369 ; M Delmas-Marty,  ‘ Refl ections on the  “ Hybridisation ” of Criminal Procedure ’ in  Jackson et al 
(eds), above n 5;  JD  Jackson ,  ‘ The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Processes :  Towards Conver-
gence, Divergence or Realignment ? ’ ( 2005 )  68  Modern Law Review  737 ;  M  McConville and  C  Mirsky ,  ‘ Guilty Plea 
Courts :  A Social Disciplinary Model of Criminal Justice ’ ( 1995 )  42  Social Problems  216 ;  M  King ,  The Framework of 
Criminal Justice ( London ,  Croom Helm ,  1981 ) ch 2. 
 adversarial and inquisitorial elements with other political, socio-economic or cultural fac-
tors into a galaxy of procedural hybrids. 9 The advent of international criminal proceedings 
and the pervasive contemporary infl uences of globalisation and legal cosmopolitanism on 
domestic criminal proceedings present further challenges, and opportunities for insight, in 
theoretical modelling. 
 Many of these models of criminal process have demonstrated their heuristic value 
through longevity and myriad insightful applications, and most of them have  something 
interesting to say about some aspect of criminal process, be it ever so local and tempo-
rally circumscribed. Models, to some extent, come in and go out of fashion with the times. 
 Crucially, there is no reason to think that any single model must enjoy a unique or exclusive 
claim to wisdom and insight. Indeed, most — if not all — of the familiar models of criminal 
process tend to emphasise certain features of interest whilst downplaying or ignoring, and 
thus potentially obscuring, other signifi cant features of criminal proceedings. For example, 
it might simultaneously be true (for any specifi ed criminal justice process) that police stop 
and search is discriminatory as a practice  and that defendants generally receive fair tri-
als irrespective of ethnicity; or again, that criminal process is systematically class-biased 
 and that working-class offenders generally receive their just deserts. To build up a lifelike 
 portrait of this complex reality, in all its light and shade, will almost certainly require a 
range of theoretical models and methodological techniques rather than a single reductive 
pen-and-ink sketch. 
 It is in this methodologically pluralistic spirit that this book promotes  ‘ integrity ’ as a 
timely, signifi cant and powerfully illuminating, but as yet still largely untapped, concep-
tual resource for investigating and evaluating criminal process. The timeliness of  ‘ integ-
rity ’ derives from its increasing popularity with police, prosecution agencies, regulatory 
 bodies and common law courts; and this institutional anchorage underscores its signifi -
cance.  ‘ Integrity ’ is not merely a scholar ’ s or external critic ’ s explanatory concept: it is also 
embedded in practitioners ’ discourses and has jurisprudential signifi cance in positive law. 
Finally, the power of illumination we ascribe to  ‘ integrity ’ is attributable to a combina-
tion of its resonance with extant legal categories and prevailing practices and its potential 
contributions to normative projects of critical jurisprudence and law reform. Integrity, in 
short, contributes an additional high-powered lens to the existing kaleidoscope of theoreti-
cal perspectives on criminal process. 
 The following chapters supply the proof of the pudding for this sweeping theoretical 
claim (or less ambitiously, will test our primary methodological hypothesis), by recon-
sidering afresh perennial topics and issues in the light of criminal process integrity. The 
essays are loosely organised according to the sequential logic of common law criminal 
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 10  P  Roberts and  J  Hunter (eds),  Criminal Evidence and Human Rights ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2012 ) . 
 11  For example,  Hunter v Walters ( 1870 )  LR 11 Eq 292, 293 ( ‘ Ralph Walters was a person in whose integrity 
the highest confi dence was placed by his clients ’ );  Speight v Gaunt ( 1883 )  9 AC 1, 6 (HL) ( ‘ The respondent had 
no reason to distrust either the professional capacity, or the solvency, or the integrity of Richard Ernest Cooke ’ ). 
 12  For example,  Guardians of Halifax Union v Wheelwright ( 1875 )  LR 10 Ex 183, 193 ( ‘ A confi dence might be 
well placed in the integrity and character of some persons, which would not belong to  any person entrusted with 
money ’ ). 
 13  For example,  Wright v Sanderson ( 1884 )  9 PD 149, 156 (CA) ( ‘ In the present case (as in others of the same 
kind) there is neither any suspicion of fraud nor any ground for calling in question the integrity of the witnesses ’ ). 
 14  R v Almon ( 1765 )  Wilm 243, 256 – 57; 97 ER 94, 100 ; cited by  Wills  J in  R v Davies [ 1906 ]  1 KB 32, 40 (DC) . 
 15  Jenks v Turpin ( 1884 )  13 QBD 505, 521 (DC) . 
 16  R v Cox and Railton ( 1884 )  14 QBD 153, 166 (CCR) (Grove J) . 
 17  Public Notaries Act 1843, s 4 (concerning  ‘ testimonials, certifi cates, or proofs as to the character, integrity, 
ability, and competency of any person who shall hereafter apply for admission or re-admission as a public notary ’ ). 
 18  Speech to Jury (2) [ 1841 ]  NSWSupC 94 ;  R v Davidson [ 1841 ]  NSWSupC 43 . And see  In re Tyler; R v Rossi 
[ 1829 ]  NSWSupC 25 , (1828) NSW Sel Cas (Dowling) 568. 
 proceedings, starting with the initial phases of criminal investigation, interrogation of sus-
pects and charging practice, prosecutorial discretion, pre-trial case preparation (including 
interviewing witnesses and instructing experts), plea-bargaining, trial procedure and evi-
dence, verdict and judgment, and concluding with appeals and post-conviction remedies 
for miscarriages of justice. But the progression of ideas in the following pages is not entirely 
linear or confi ned within an (idealised) structural model of criminal process. Different 
strands of the theme of integrity are woven throughout each chapter ’ s topical discussion, 
building up into a series of thematically related case studies in the integrity of criminal 
 process. In bringing together discussions of Australian, British, Hong Kong and US crimi-
nal process, this volume should also be regarded as an extension of previous work and a 
further exemplar of  ‘ common law comparativism ’ . 10 
 The tasks for this Introduction are, fi rst, to supply a little more institutional context 
through a potted survey of recent  ‘ integrity jurisprudence ’ , and secondly, to offer, by way of 
initial orientation for explorers of unfamiliar territory, a working conceptual elucidation 
and taxonomy of integrity in criminal process, emphasising its dual character as (explana-
tory) theoretical heuristic and (normative) juristic ideal. 
 2. Integrity Jurisprudence 
 Integrity is not an entirely novel jurisprudential concept. Numerous nineteenth-century 
English cases invoke  ‘ integrity ’ in relation to personal or professional honesty, 11 good 
character 12 or witness credibility. 13 Intriguingly, one also fi nds early reported references 
to the  ‘ justice and integrity ’ of courts and judges, 14 the integrity of schemes of criminal 
penalties, 15 and  ‘ principles which do form part of the law, and which it is of the highest 
importance to maintain in their integrity ’ . 16 References to  ‘ integrity ’ in primary English 
legislation can be traced back, at least, to 1843. 17 Further afi eld, judicial references to the 
integrity of legal proceedings appear as early as 1825 in Tasmania, within two decades of 
the founding of the grim Hobart penal colony. A little later we fi nd a circuit judge extol-
ling the importance of  ‘ integrity ’ to jurymen at Bathurst Circuit Court, west of the Sydney 
penal colony. 18  Nonetheless, integrity-talk appears to have increased dramatically in recent 
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 19  PH  Winfi eld ,  History of Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal Procedures ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge University Press , 
 1921 )  171 (noting that if the practice of parties paying jurors were to become a  ‘ common occurrence  … it would 
have an evil effect on the integrity of jurors in general ’ ). 
 20  AL-T  Choo ,  Abuse of Process and Judicial Stays of Criminal Proceedings ,  2nd edn ( Oxford ,  Oxford University 
Press ,  2008 )  16 . Also see  P  Roberts and  A  Zuckerman ,  Criminal Evidence ,  2nd edn ( Oxford ,  Oxford University 
Press ,  2010 )  22 . 
 21  A free-text word search for  ‘ integrity ’ of the entire Westlaw UK database conducted on 8 January 2015 pro-
duced 8,655  ‘ hits ’ for case law and another 1,097 for legislation. A total of 2,508 of these hits are categorised as 
relating to Criminal Law. Restricting the search parameters to pre-1 January 2000 mentions reduces the cor-
responding hits to 2,802 (case law), 269 (legislation) and 436 (crime). For the period up to 1 January 1980, hits 
further decrease to 1,400 (case law), 24 (legislation) and 122 (crime). For the entire century 1850 – 1950, the cor-
responding hits are 621 (case law), 2 (legislation) and 49 (crime); which is signifi cantly fewer in all categories than 
for  the last two years 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2015 (case law  = 966; legislation  = 251; crime  = 341). 
 22  Pearse v Pearse ( 1846 )  1 De G  & Sm 12, 28 – 29; 63 ER 950, 957 . 
 23  Notably including  R v Christie [ 1914 ]  AC 545 (HL) ;  Kuruma v R [ 1955 ]  AC 197, 204 (PC) (Lord Goddard 
CJ); and  R v Sang [ 1980 ]  AC 402 (HL) . 
 24  Ibrahim v R [ 1914 ]  AC 599, 609 – 10 (PC) ;  P  Mirfi eld ,  Confessions ( London ,  Sweet  & Maxwell ,  1985 ) . 
 25  Lawrie v Muir  1950 SLT 37 ; critically contextualised by  P  Duff ,  ‘ Irregularly Obtained Real Evidence :  The 
 Scottish Solution ? ’ ( 2004 )  8  International Journal of Evidence and Proof  77 . 
 26  People v O ’ Brien [ 1965 ]  IR 142 . Generally, see J Jackson,  ‘ Human Rights, Constitutional Law and Exclusion-
ary Safeguards in Ireland ’ in Roberts and Hunter (eds), above n 10. 
years, both in volume and signifi cance. It is striking, for example, that whereas Winfi eld ’ s 
two 1921  volumes on abuse of legal procedure contained just one incidental mention of 
 ‘ integrity ’ , 19 Andrew Choo ’ s contemporary reconsideration of the topic founds the courts ’ 
inherent jurisdiction to stay criminal proceedings for abuse of process on a  ‘ principle 
of legitimacy ’ cashed out in terms of  ‘ protecting the moral integrity of the adjudicative 
 process ’ . 20  Integrity ’ s burgeoning jurisprudential signifi cance is amply confi rmed by rough 
quantitative snapshots from basic Westlaw searches. 21 These data indicate that juridical dis-
courses of integrity, at least in English and UK jurisprudence, are a predominantly late 
twentieth-century phenomenon, displaying exponential increases since about 1980. 
 There is both more, and less, than semantics in the current popularity of juridical integ-
rity. To some extent,  ‘ integrity ’ might be invoked as a proxy, synonym or placeholder for 
other, familiar, procedural values such as  ‘ fairness ’ ,  ‘ due process ’ ,  ‘ natural justice ’ or  ‘ judicial 
legitimacy ’ , the relative prominence of which has varied over time and between jurisdictions, 
partly — of course — as a refl ection of the locally applicable doctrinal law.  Pace  Bentham ’ s 
dogmatic insistence on factual rectitude, modern courts have always known that,  ‘ [t]ruth, 
like all other good things, may be loved unwisely — may be pursued too keenly — may cost 
too much ’ , 22 so that trade-offs must be made in adjudication between truth-fi nding and 
other normative considerations. One might say, adopting a broad view, that the judicial 
concern with procedural integrity begins with such trade-offs, whether or not the explicit 
terminology of  ‘ integrity ’ is employed. Judicial decisions to admit, or exclude, improperly 
obtained evidence are one familiar context in which zero-sum confl icts between procedural 
values routinely arise in criminal trials. Despite some widely cited dicta extolling proce-
dural fairness, 23 English law during the twentieth century was largely characterised by a 
preference for admissibility over  ‘ integrity ’ -inspired exclusion whenever evidential reliabil-
ity could reasonably be assumed. (This also accounts for the partial exception of confession 
evidence, which could be excluded at common law when admissions were  ‘ involuntary ’ 
and thus presumptively unreliable.) 24 Courts in Scotland, 25 the Republic of Ireland, 26 
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 27  R v Ireland ( 1970 )  126 CLR 321, 335 ; [1970] HCA 21 (Barwick CJ);  Driscoll v R [ 1977 ]  HCA 43 ; (1977) 137 
CLR 517 (exclusion of a disputed unsigned confession);  Bunning v Cross ( 1978 )  141 CLR 54 ; [1978] HCA 22, [29] 
(Stephen and Aickin JJ). The common law was subsequently superseded by the Australian uniform Evidence Acts, 
s 138; see  K  Mellifont ,  Fruit of the Poisoned Tree:  Evidence Derived from Illegally or Improperly Obtained Evidence 
( Annandale NSW ,  Federation Press ,  2010 ) . 
 28  Collins v R [ 2007 ]  1 SCR 350 , (1987) 38 DLR (4th) 508 , applying s 24(2) of the Constitution Act 1982. The 
Canadian Supreme Court subsequently disavowed  Collins , holding that  ‘ [t]he phrase  “ bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute ” must be understood in the long-term sense of maintaining the integrity of, and public 
confi dence in, the justice system ’ :  R v Grant [ 2009 ]  2 SCR 353 , [68]. See further, Young, Chapter 1 in this volume. 
 29  Weeks v US ,  232 US 383 ( 1914 ) ;  Mapp v Ohio ,  367 US 643 ( 1961 ) . The scope, and even the very exist-
ence, of the constitutional exclusionary rule have remained controversial in the USA. For a range of views, see eg 
 RM  Bloom and  DH  Fentin ,  ‘ “ A More Majestic Conception ” :  The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the 
Exclusionary Rule ’ ( 2010 )  13  University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law  47 ;  TE  Pettys ,  ‘ The Immoral 
Application of Exclusionary Rules ’ [ 2008 ]  Wisconsin Law Review  463 ;  G  Calabresi ,  ‘ The Exclusionary Rule ’ ( 2003 ) 
 26  Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy  111 . 
 30  Connelly v DPP [ 1964 ]  AC 1254 (HL) ;  Mills v Cooper [ 1967 ]  2 QB 459, 467 (DC) . 
 31  S v Ebrahim  1991  (2) SA 553, 582 (CA) . 
 32  R v Horseferry Road Magistrates ’ Court, ex parte Bennett [ 1994 ]  1 AC 42 (HL) . 
 33  Ibid 62 (Lord Griffi ths). Cf Lord Oliver ’ s reassertion, in dissent, of the traditional view that pre-trial abuses, 
 ‘ whatever the degree of outrage or affront they may occasion ’ , should be addressed through collateral civil or 
criminal law remedies rather than being  ‘ thought to justify the assumption by a criminal court of a jurisdiction to 
terminate a properly instituted criminal process which it is its duty to try ’ : ibid 73. 
 34  R v Latif [ 1996 ]  2 Cr App R 92, 101 (HL) . 
 Australia, 27 Canada 28 and the US federal jurisdiction 29 have arguably been more receptive 
than English judges to arguments for rights- or values-based evidentiary exclusion, at least 
until recently. Differences in these broader institutional frameworks will necessarily condi-
tion the extent to which any linguistic turn to  ‘ integrity ’ represents a substantial shift in 
judicial attitudes and criminal procedure law, rather than merely a change of nomenclature, 
in particular jurisdictions. 
 Even more closely than its natural affi nity with evidentiary exclusion, judicial integrity-
talk is bound up with permanent stays of proceedings on the grounds of abuse of process. 
Although a tribunal ’ s inherent jurisdiction to control abuses of its own process is a generic 
power, deriving from the core idea of a judicial proceeding under the rule of law, 30 its devel-
opment within common law  criminal process has been particularly striking over the last 
several decades. In a 1991 forced rendition case, the South African Court of Appeal inter-
vened to prevent an abuse of process  ‘ so as to protect and promote the dignity and integrity 
of the judicial system ’ . 31 This judgment was cited by Lord Bridge several years later in what 
has become a leading authority on granting stays for abuse of process in several common 
law jurisdictions,  R v Horseferry Road Magistrates Court, ex parte Bennett . 32 Albeit with-
out propounding the concept of  ‘ integrity ’ per se,  Bennett famously declared that serious 
procedural irregularities might require legal proceedings to be stayed irrespective of their 
substantive merits, on the principled basis that  ‘ the judiciary accept a responsibility for the 
maintenance of the rule of law that embraces a willingness to oversee executive action and 
to refuse to countenance behaviour that threatens either basic human rights or the rule of 
law ’ . 33 Two and half years later, Lord Steyn explicitly adopted the language of  ‘ integrity ’ in 
considering the impact of alleged police entrapment on procedural propriety.  ‘ [T]he issue ’ , 
his Lordship stated,  ‘ is whether, despite the fact that a fair trial was possible, the judge ought 
to have stayed the criminal proceedings on broader considerations of the integrity of the 
criminal justice system ’ . 34 
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 35  R v Donald [ 1997 ]  2 Cr App R (S) 272, 275 (CA) . 
 36  R v Edwards (Maxine) [ 1996 ]  2 Cr App R 345, 349 (CA) . 
 37  Taylor v Serious Fraud Offi ce [ 1998 ]  EMLR 463, 478 (CA) . 
 38  R v Comerford [ 1998 ]  1 WLR 191 , 195 . Also see  R v Thorpe [ 1996 ]  1 Cr App R 269 (CA) . 
 39  R v Home Secretary ex parte Hindley [ 1998 ]  QB 751, 770 (DC) . 
 40  Quoted approvingly in  R v Davis (Michael George) [ 2001 ]  1 Cr App R 8 , [53] (CA) . 
 41  R v Farooqi [ 2014 ]  1 Cr App R 8 , [2013] EWCA Crim 1649, [102];  R v Connors [ 2013 ]  EWCA Crim 368 , [33] . 
 42  R v C [ 2014 ]  EWCA Crim 343 , [6]. 
 43  In re ITN [ 2014 ]  1 WLR 199 , [2013] EWCA Crim 773, [10]. 
 44  R v Clayton [ 2014 ]  1 WLR 3994 , [2014] EWCA Crim 103, [10]. 
 45  For example,  Barclay v Richardson [ 2012 ]  HCHAC 168 (integrity of investigations and prosecutions);  Toal v 
HM Advocate [ 2012 ]  HCJAC 123 (integrity of a jury ’ s verdict);  Telford v HM Advocate [ 2012 ]  HCJAC 88 (integrity 
of the court);  Starrs v Ruxton  2000 JC 208 , [2000] HRLR 191. 
 46  For example,  R v McConville [ 2014 ]  NICA 41 ;  R v McKeown [ 2004 ]  NICA 41 . 
 47  Warren v A-G for Jersey [ 2012 ]  1 AC 22 , [2011] UKPC 10, [24] – [25]. Lord Dyson added that  ‘ an infi nite 
variety of cases can arise and how the discretion should be exercised will depend on the particular circumstances 
of the case ’ . 
 48  Ibid [83]. 
 49  R v Maxwell [ 2011 ]  1 WLR 1837 , [2010] UKSC 48. 
 50  Ibid [115]. 
 51  R v Rothman [ 1981 ]  1 SCR 640 . 
 Since these pioneering decisions of the mid 1990s judicial references to  ‘ the integrity ’ 
of the criminal process have become commonplace. English appellate courts were soon 
expatiating on  ‘ the integrity of police operations and public confi dence in them ’ ; 35  ‘ the 
integrity of police evidence ’ ; 36  ‘ the integrity of the discovery process ’ ; 37  ‘ the integrity of an 
individual juror, and thus of the jury as a whole ’ ; 38 and  ‘ confi dence in the integrity of the 
sentencing or tariff-fi xing process ’ . 39 In the unreported but publicly high-profi le appeals in 
 R v Hickey (1997) — the case popularly known as the  ‘ Bridgewater Four ’ — Roch LJ declared 
that  ‘ the integrity of the criminal process is the most important consideration for courts 
which have to hear appeals against conviction ’ . 40 More recent case law is peppered with 
generalised references to  ‘ the integrity of the trial process ’ , 41  ‘ the integrity of the adminis-
tration of justice ’ , 42  ‘ the integrity of the criminal trial ’ , 43 and  ‘ the integrity of the criminal 
justice system ’ . 44 Integrity-talk likewise features in judgments of the Scottish High Court 
of Justiciary 45 and the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal. 46 In  Warren , a case in which the 
police had employed tracking and listening devices without fi rst obtaining the necessary 
permissions for their use outside the jurisdiction, the Privy Council endorsed Choo ’ s  ‘ useful 
summary ’ of relevant jurisprudential principles, making the defi nitive issue  ‘ whether the 
continuation of the proceedings would compromise the moral integrity of the criminal 
justice system to an unacceptable degree ’ . 47 Lord Kerr emphasised that  ‘ [t]he focus should 
always be on whether the stay is required in order to safeguard the integrity of the criminal 
justice system ’ . 48 In  Maxwell , 49 where the question before the courts was whether, follow-
ing a successful appeal against conviction, a retrial could properly proceed in the light of 
revelations of serious misconduct and criminality by investigating offi cers, the UK Supreme 
Court mentions  ‘ integrity ’ no fewer than 21 times. By a narrow three to two majority, the 
prosecution was allowed to proceed, but only on the basis of untainted evidence. Dissent-
ing on the facts, Lord Collins stated emphatically that  ‘ the interests of justice demand the 
application of the integrity principle ’ . 50 
 Increasing judicial resort to the language of  ‘ integrity ’ can also be observed across the 
wider Commonwealth. An early Canadian example is  Rothman , 51 where Justice Estey, 
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 52  Ibid 658. 
 53  R v Anderson [ 2014 ]  2 SCR 167 , [50] ;  R v Nixon [ 2011 ]  2 SCR 566 , [38], [64]. 
 54  R v Sinclair [ 2010 ]  2 SCR 310 , [167]:  ‘ [I]t is also in society ’ s interest that constitutional rights be respected at 
the pre-trial stage, as doing so ensures the integrity of the criminal process from start to fi nish ’ . See further, C Boyle 
and E Cunliffe,  ‘ Right to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation in Canada: Not Keeping Up with the Common 
Law Joneses ’ in Roberts and Hunter (eds), above n 10. 
 55  R v Regan [ 2002 ]  1 SCR 297 , [151]:  ‘ It is clear that Crown Attorneys perform an essential  “ Minister of  Justice ” 
role at all stages of their work. Their role in considering or carrying forward a prosecution is of the highest impor-
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 56  R v NS [ 2012 ]  3 SCR 726 , [78]. 
 57  R v Yumnu [ 2012 ]  3 SCR 777 , [38]:  ‘ The mere thought of the Crown and the police  “ checking out ” potential 
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 61  R v Buhay [ 2003 ]  1 SCR 631 , [73]. 
 62  R v McInnis ( 1979 )  143 CLR 575 , [26]. 
 63  Lowe v R ( 1984 )  154 CLR 606, 611 – 12 . 
in dissent, linked the concept of integrity to the common law evidentiary rule excluding 
involuntary confessions from criminal trials. The  ‘ basic reason for the rule ’ , Justice Estey 
asserted,  ‘ is a concern for the integrity of the criminal justice system ’ , considering that the 
 ‘ support and respect of the community for that system can only be maintained if persons in 
authority conduct themselves in a way that does not bring the administration of justice into 
 disrepute ’ . 52 Since  Rothman , integrity has been expansively woven into the Supreme Court 
of Canada ’ s jurisprudence on constitutional rights and freedoms. It is now settled Canadian 
law that prosecutorial discretion can be reviewed where state offi cials ’ conduct is  ‘ egregious 
and seriously compromises trial fairness and/or the integrity of the justice system ’ . 53 Recent 
cases expressly link  ‘ the integrity ’ of criminal proceedings to, for example, access to pre-
trial custodial legal advice, 54 the special responsibilities of prosecuting Crown Attorneys 
as  ‘ ministers of justice ’ , 55 procedural rules governing witness testimony, 56 the evils of jury 
tampering, 57 and the fi nality of adjudication. 58 The Supreme Court of Canada has stated 
that  ‘ [t]he integrity of our legal system depends in large measure on the integrity of those 
charged with its administration and enforcement ’ . 59 It has also — not unproblematically 60 —
 opined that  ‘ [t]he decision to exclude evidence always represents a balance between the 
interests of truth on one side and the integrity of the judicial system on the other ’ . 61 
 References to integrity in the jurisprudence of the High Court of Australia follow a simi-
lar pattern and trajectory, with dissenting judgments playing a pioneering role. In a 1979 
case in which the trial court had refused to grant an adjournment to an unrepresented 
defendant, Justice Murphy was a lone voice in fi nding a substantial miscarriage of justice, 
on the basis that  ‘ [c]ourts should not allow the integrity of the judicial process to be under-
mined by the fi nancial exigencies of legal aid schemes ’ . 62 In another dissent in  Lowe a few 
years later, Justice Mason warned that  ‘ inconsistency in punishment, because it is regarded 
as a badge of unfairness and unequal treatment under the law, is calculated to lead to an 
erosion of public confi dence in the integrity of the administration of justice ’ . 63 Later, the 
integrity motif begins to surface and play a more signifi cant role in majority opinions, 
doubtless reinforced by the courts ’ parallel development of a fair trial jurisprudence rooted 
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in normative principles. 64 For example, in  Moti , where the majority found that the defend-
ant ’ s illegal deportation to Australia amounted to an abuse of process, the court emphasised 
 ‘ the trust reposed constitutionally in the courts to protect the integrity and fairness of their 
processes ’ . 65 In  Smith v Western Australia , the High Court recently averred that  ‘ the fi rst 
duty of the courts [is] to preserve the integrity of the system of criminal justice which they 
administer ’ . Serious allegations of juror misconduct were matters of prime judicial respon-
sibility, because  ‘ [t]he institutional integrity of the system of justice is at stake in a way that 
is not the case where the issue is solely one between the parties ’ . 66 
 Similar references to the integrity of criminal process also feature in the jurisprudence of 
the New Zealand Supreme Court, which was established in 2004. In  Hansen , for example, 
that Court observed that  ‘ the presumption of innocence helps command the confi dence 
of the general public in the integrity of the administration of the criminal law ’ . 67 More 
recently, in  Siemer v Solicitor-General , 68 the New Zealand Supreme Court noted the concep-
tual and normative connections between institutional integrity and the (human) right to a 
fair trial, whilst in  Wilson 69 the Court was confronted with a catalogue of police impropriety 
(a falsely sworn search warrant, followed by a bogus prosecution and an attempt to impli-
cate the Chief Judge of the District Court in an elaborate police ruse) which, the appellant 
submitted, would  ‘ undermine the integrity of the justice system ’ 70 unless the proceedings 
were stayed. Although the appellant ’ s convictions were quashed without any order for a 
re-trial, only Elias CJ concluded that the  ‘ irremediably tainted ’ proceedings should have 
been stayed 71 — an indication of the malleability and indeterminacy of appeals to  ‘ integrity ’ , 
which is another of this book ’ s recurring themes. 
 Hong Kong courts have been debating similar issues in recent years, and likewise employ-
ing integrity-based arguments and concepts. In relation to the discretionary exclusion of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence, the Hong Kong courts are charged with  ‘ ensuring 
that the integrity of the judicial system is not compromised ’ . 72 In an earlier case, the Hong 
Kong Court of Final Appeal noted the legitimate  ‘ public expectation that persons charged 
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with serious criminal offences will be brought to trial ’ , but immediately added that,  ‘ [o]n 
the other hand, the Court must have regard to preserving the integrity of the criminal 
 justice system ’ . 73 
 We do not purport to offer a comprehensive or systematic survey of increasing judicial 
resort to the concept of integrity in recent decades across the common law world. A great 
deal more might conceivably be said concerning ostensible patterns of usage and signifi -
cance, their geographical spread, cross-jurisdictional infl uences, and noteworthy fl uctu-
ations — including shortfalls — in the currency of integrity. In  Chapter 1 of this volume, 
Simon Young extends this preliminary exposition of integrity jurisprudence, drawing out 
its broader constitutional implications and signifi cance for human rights, accountability, 
legitimacy and public confi dence in the administration of criminal justice. Many further 
examples and illustrations of juridical integrity will be encountered in the following pages, 
embedded within contributors ’ discussions of particular criminal process issues, debates 
and developments. For now, by way of introduction, it is enough to have demonstrated that 
 ‘ integrity jurisprudence ’ is a real, trans-jurisdictional phenomenon, which evidently merits 
careful scholarly scrutiny and critical evaluation. 
 3. Juridical Integrity 
 Further discussion might profi tably begin with some semantic and conceptual clarifi ca-
tion. The  Oxford English Dictionary 74 defi nes  ‘ integrity ’ as,  ‘ [t]he condition of having no 
part or element taken away or wanting; undivided or unbroken state; material wholeness, 
completeness, entirety  … The condition of not being marred or violated; unimpaired or 
uncorrupted condition; original perfect state; soundness ’ . And specifi cally in relation to 
moral integrity,  ‘ [s]oundness of moral principle; the character of uncorrupted virtue, esp. 
in relation to truth and fair dealing; uprightness, honesty, sincerity ’ . Its Latin etymology 
anchors the concept of integrity in that which is whole and wholesome, unsullied, pristine. 
 As a normative value, integrity conveys the impression of being almost unequivocally 
laudable, right and good. Whereas most virtues (Aristotle taught us) 75 tend to become vices 
when practised to excess, it is diffi cult to see how somebody could have  too much integrity. 
Of course, there can always be competing considerations of prudence (think of Thomas 
More having too much integrity for his own — self-interested — good) or competing values 
potentially outweighing integrity in particular contexts, in the way that justice ought some-
times to be tempered by mercy. 76 But it is not easy to think of obvious analogues for integ-
rity of, say, over-generosity or foolish bravery or brutal honesty, where the tipping point 
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to excess is internal to the value itself. (Fanatical integrity, perhaps ? ) Integrity is linked to 
authenticity, reliability, constancy, fair dealing and sound judgement. A person of integrity 
treats others in accordance with her deepest enduring convictions about how people ought 
to be treated; she is true to her values and true to herself. The sycophant and the gadfl y as 
much as the hypocrite lack integrity. A person of integrity may be vulnerable to certain 
kinds of suasion or blackmail, but she is not easily corruptible. To say that everybody can be 
coerced or bullied if you can locate and exploit their human weaknesses is not the same as 
saying that  ‘ every man has his price ’ . 
 It may be possible to characterise moral rigidity as an excess of integrity, as where  ‘ the 
man of principle ’ is actually an insufferable holier-than-thou prig. That might be a fair 
criticism of those who ostentatiously stand on their honour and seek to infl ate every con-
testable issue into a matter of principle. But it is not obvious why such a character fl aw or its 
associated lapses of judgement should be regarded as symptoms of too much, rather than 
betraying too little, integrity. To be sure, to err is human, and to make a mistake — including 
a mistake about the requirements of morality — is not per se to lack integrity. But a prig 
is not merely in error. Utilitarians have been known to dismiss moral integrity as a kind 
of narcissistic vanity elevating personal conscience over the dictates of collective morality, 
but this objection arises from a thoroughgoing agent-neutrality with disturbing normative 
implications which few but card-carrying utilitarians are prepared to countenance. 77 
 Part of the particular appeal of integrity is attributable to what might be described as its 
essentially  ‘ procedural ’ character. Integrity can be distinguished from  ‘ substantive ’ virtues 
like generosity, loyalty, honesty, or bravery, inasmuch as integrity is concerned with the 
way in which we relate to, think about, schedule, prioritise, and act on and through our 
other (substantive) values, whatever they happen to be. It follows that a person of integrity 
is not necessarily a good person. Bigots and brutal dictators are not necessarily lacking in 
personal integrity, whatever their other serious moral failings. So integrity shares this much 
with familiar juristic procedural values like  ‘ natural justice ’ and  ‘ due process ’ : although they 
are plausibly regarded as intrinsic values in their own right, forming an irreducibly con-
stitutive part of comprehensive accounts of justice, procedural values promote good out-
comes only in conjunction with other, substantive values requiring independent normative 
justifi cation. 
 Viewed in this way, there is an instructive parallel between integrity as a moral virtue 
and the second-order, superintending role played by practical reasonableness in theories of 
moral deliberation and practical action. 78 Like practical reason, integrity is integrative with 
regard to our other values, both at the moment of deliberation or action and also, crucially, 
over time. Integrity has nothing to do with tunnel vision or bloody-mindedness. A person 
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of integrity may well change her mind in response to new experiences or other pertinent 
information, even in relation to matters of fundamental moral signifi cance to her. But a 
person of integrity does not blow hot and cold or mindlessly follow fashion. Just as a court 
should arrive at the same decision on the basis of the same evidence tomorrow or in a year ’ s 
time as it does today (assuming no material change in the law), the person of integrity 
can be relied upon to embrace an enduring commitment to her convictions and practical 
judgements. Having made her bed, she lies in it without compunction or regret. The person 
of integrity is  ‘ for all seasons ’ , durable in any weather without losing her essential moral 
bearings or casting off her character-defi ning commitments before the prevailing winds 
of short-term pragmatism or social convention. Indeed, keeping faith with our past moral 
commitments and taking responsibility for our decisions and their future consequences 
is, in signifi cant measure, what it means to be a  person and to be  the same person over 
time. We are experientially fully ourselves — we  ‘ keep it together ’ , colloquially speaking —
 only when we are able to sustain both psychological and normative integration across space 
and time. 79 Institutions claiming political authority — including policing, courts and legal 
systems — can analogously be thought of as having, or lacking, an integrated character and 
normative coherence over time. 
 It is tempting to think that substantive values are always,  ceteris paribus , more important 
than  ‘ mere ’ procedural considerations. But the simple equation of the procedural with the 
relatively less important is fallacious. 80 Procedural concepts and values like  ‘ fair trial ’ or 
the presumption of innocence, for example, have far greater institutional purchase and 
 symbolic resonance than many rules of substantive criminal law. And so it is that integrity 
is not merely a personal virtue of moral action. It is also an  institutional virtue with especial 
signifi cance for public institutions concerned with fair process and just outcomes. People 
might fervently wish — investing, perhaps, in hope over experience — for a world in which 
politicians behaved with integrity, but they positively demand this from their courts and 
judges and, more generally, from institutions administering justice and from the law itself. 
Law without integrity is capriciousness in robes, naked power without legitimacy. 81 One 
might even argue, echoing Dworkin, that  ‘ integrity ’ should replace  ‘ justice-as-fairness ’ in 
Rawls ’ celebrated account of the fi rst virtue of public institutions. 82 Dworkin championed 
integrity as  ‘ a distinct political ideal ’ 83 providing the best interpretation of our existing 
practices of legislation and adjudication,  ‘ best ’ in the two-fold sense that law-as-integrity 
aspires both to describe institutional practices accurately  and simultaneously to supply 
their best normative justifi cation. Dworkin ’ s methodological turn to  interpretivism 84 was 
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intended to break the sterile impasse between  ‘ legal positivist ’ and  ‘ natural law ’ arguments 
in contemporary Anglo-American jurisprudence by transcending hackneyed contrasts 
between law as found and law as made, 85 between law as it is and law as it ought to be. 86 
Dworkin insisted that: 
 Law ’ s empire is defi ned by attitude, not territory or power or process  … It is an interpretive, self-
refl ective attitude addressed to politics in the broadest sense  … [T]he imperatives of integrity 
always challenge today ’ s law with the possibilities of tomorrow ’ s … every decision in a hard case is 
a vote for one of law ’ s dreams. 87 
 Setting aside for present purposes points of exegetical dispute and general debates about 
Dworkin ’ s philosophy of law (which tend to elicit rather polarised reactions), 88 the concept 
of integrity as a fundamental procedural value of law, legality and legal process seems both 
analytically illuminating and normatively appealing. Particularly as developed by Gerald 
Postema in his resonant evocation of  ‘ justice in workclothes ’ , 89 integrity might be viewed 
as a fundamental value not only for legislators or appellate court judges deciding  ‘ hard 
cases ’ , but also as a primary normative resource, and commitment, informing the everyday 
conduct and decision-making of police detectives, prosecutors, defence lawyers, trial coun-
sel, and fi rst instance judges in criminal proceedings. Integrity, in other words, should be 
regarded as integral to legal professional ethics, informal occupational practices (especially 
those involving  ‘ discretionary ’ decision-making), administrative rules and orders, codes of 
practice, and similar variations on the theme of  ‘ soft-law ’ regulation or institutionalised 
 ‘ working rules ’ 90 materially affecting the conduct and infl uencing the outcomes of criminal 
investigations, prosecutions and trials. Or as Chief Justice Brennan of the Australian High 
Court once put it: 
 Integrity is the fi delity to legal duty  … It is the faithful adherence of the courts to the laws enacted 
by the Parliament, however undesirable the courts may think them to be, which is the guarantee of 
public confi dence in the integrity of the judicial process and the protection of the courts ’ repute as 
the administrator of criminal justice. 91 
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 4. Integrity and Criminal Process 
 Our preliminary efforts at defi nition and conceptual elucidation have established an 
 intimate connection between integrity, as a primary institutional virtue, and theories of 
law, constitutional government under the rule of law, procedural justice, judicial responsi-
bility and professional ethics. These relatively abstract connections are given more concrete, 
institutionalised, tangible form in the following pages. Each of this volume ’ s essays might be 
thought of as a practical test bed for integrity ’ s theoretical and methodological virtues in the 
context of criminal proceedings; or perhaps, as a collection of practice pieces embroidering 
justice ’ s workclothes. Simon Young, in  Chapter 1 , further explores the conceptual parame-
ters, historical development and doctrinal substance of integrity jurisprudence from a more 
overtly Public Law perspective. Young urges us to see that  ‘ [r]ecognising criminal courts as 
public law courts, and their integrity as a prime consideration of public policy and political 
morality ’ , 92 opens up a broader range of public interest factors and remedial possibilities in 
the administration of criminal justice. The relationship between Public Law and Criminal 
Law features prominently in several other essays in the volume, especially those concerned 
with the powers, responsibilities and democratic accountability of public prosecutors. This 
is one, relatively localised manifestation of the book ’ s appetite for interdisciplinarity which, 
in other contributions, embraces socio-legal research, policy studies, feminism, cognitive 
science, epistemology, narrative, ethics and political theory. 
 To suggest a more structured analytical framework, and by way of potted preview of the 
essays themselves, the remainder of this Introduction identifi es four principal strands or 
facets of the complex relationship between integrity and criminal process, which together 
constitute the volume ’ s unifying threads. There are also, of course, unresolved tensions, 
unanswered questions, and plenty of scope for sceptical appraisals of appeals to the  ‘ integ-
rity ’ of criminal process, in theory or in practice. The language of integrity, in professional 
discourses or policy pronouncements, must not become fatuous rhetoric or, worse, an 
 ideological smokescreen cloaking its absence in reality. 
 (a) Integrity as Fidelity to Advertised Normative Standards 
 The most straightforward question that we might pose about the  ‘ integrity ’ of criminal 
process is to ask whether, in practice, it lives up to its advertised principles and policies. 
Is there a seamless progression, or rather a disconcerting gap, between criminal process ’ s 
normative ideals and policy commitments and their institutionalised practical realities ? 
Implicit in this question is the need to specify the criminal process ’ s authentic norma-
tive ideals; and this is likely to be a controversial, and possibly convoluted, undertaking. 93 
Any complex set of institutionalised human practices will fail to live up to its idealised 
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self-conception on occasion, just as wrongful conviction of the innocent is an occupational 
hazard of operating  any criminal justice process. Isolated instances of human frailty should 
not be taken to constitute collective lapses of integrity (though they might well demonstrate 
failures of integrity on the part of the particular individuals concerned). However,  repeated 
or  systematic failures to live up to advertised standards raise justifi ed suspicions of compla-
cency, if not fl agrant hypocrisy, suggesting that criminal process has no real intention of 
practicing what it preaches. Default in gross might properly be characterised as a failure of 
institutional integrity. 
 Julie Stubbs, in  Chapter 2 , poses this question in relation to the apparent failures of 
policing, over many years and across multiple legal jurisdictions, successfully to implement 
effective strategies to combat so-called  ‘ domestic ’ violence. Feminist activism, criminologi-
cal research data and offi cial statistics accumulated over many decades converge on the 
conclusion that female victims of intimate violence are  ‘ over-policed and under-protected ’ 
by criminal law. 94 However, as Stubbs ’ comparative survey shows, the issues are complex. 
 ‘ Pro-arrest ’ and  ‘ no-drop ’ policies designed to improve enforcement come in several varie-
ties, and they can fail or even backfi re for various reasons. An interesting recent devel-
opment is the novel use in domestic litigation of international human rights standards 
as a source of positive obligations on states to protect everyone, in equality, from lethal 
threats and serious harm. 95 Albeit an imaginative way of testing the sincerity of offi cial pol-
icy commitments to tackling domestic violence, in court these arguments predictably run 
up against the common law ’ s traditional deference to operational discretion in  policing. 96 
A more fundamental objection is that more intensive state surveillance and extensive 
intervention, especially in the form of aggressive policing and criminal law enforcement, 
do not  necessarily empower victims  or treat suspects and offenders fairly. Stubbs calls for 
 thoroughgoing reconsideration of how a polity might respond with integrity to the chal-
lenges and contradictions of domestic violence policing. This would seemingly require a 
victim-centred and holistic perspective, in which criminal law enforcement is only one 
strand of an integrated approach, buttressed by an intelligent division of institutional 
labour and effective inter-agency partnerships. 
 David Dixon ’ s critical discussion of police interrogation tactics, in  Chapter 3 , exposes 
another potential gap between operational practice and the law ’ s own advertised normative 
requirements — which in the two notorious murder cases he analyses in detail led to the 
inadmissibility of confessions procured in breach of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
(PACE) 1984. 97 It is unnecessary to develop a sophisticated conceptual analysis to grasp the 
elementary point that police investigators sometimes break the procedural rules designed to 
regulate their conduct. The more interesting proposition emerging from Dixon ’ s discussion 
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is that the rules themselves may be uncertain or contested. For example, the highly contro-
versial  ‘ Reid Technique ’ for interviewing criminal suspects widely embraced in the USA, 
and which seems to pervade police offi cers ’ questioning in some of the interview excerpts 
reproduced by Dixon in  Chapter 3 , is evidently in tension with English law ’ s demands for 
non-oppressive interrogations and reliable confessions. 98 But this theory of interrogation, 
directly or indirectly, reinforced British detectives in their existing investigative practices, 
which they believed to be lawful and legitimate; until the courts said otherwise. 99 In such 
instances of normative ambiguity, competing claims to authority or confl icting loyalties, 
integrity serves as a prescriptive standard, or reasoning methodology, for reordering priori-
ties and adjudicating  ‘ hard cases ’ where there is something to be said on both sides of an 
argument. Similar normative ambiguities and operational dilemmas arise, for example, in 
relation to prosecutors ’ pre-trial interviews with witnesses (explored by Paul Roberts in 
Chapter 7), immunised accomplice testimony (reconsidered by Michael Jackson in Chap-
ter 8) and the duties of prosecutors in adducing expert evidence (vigorously asserted by 
Gary Edmond in Chapter 9). Each chapter offers further illustrations of practical contexts 
in which integrity might afford criminal practitioners, policymakers and theorists greater 
direction and insight into their respective legal and ethical duties and practical objectives. 
 Contextual failures of integrity, in policy implementation or adherence to procedural 
law, might sometimes plausibly be regarded as sporadic and localised. They do not neces-
sarily undermine the legitimacy of the entire adjudicative system. This is, however, pre-
cisely the dystopian scenario entertained by Mike McConville and Luke Marsh in Chapter 4. 
Their contribution to this volume develops an astonishing parallel between the indefensible 
practices of industrialised factory farming and a morally bankrupt criminal process cor-
rupted by its addiction to pressurised guilty pleas. The analogy encompasses both process 
and product, to serve up (in either case) a distinctly unappetising dish. The implications are 
radical. Yet recent reforms of English criminal procedure, introduced against a backdrop of 
fi scal austerity, tend to reinforce rather than contradict their position. 100 
 Writing from the perspective of a very experienced senior prosecutor, Nicholas Cowdery 
in  Chapter 5 denies neither the inherent risks of accepting guilty pleas nor the institutional 
constraints and practical frustrations of criminal justice administration. He nonetheless 
maintains that pleas of guilty attracting sentencing discounts can in principle achieve 
just outcomes, at least where they are the product of a structured legal process (such as 
that in operation in New South Wales) rooted in prosecutorial independence, informed 
decision-making and appropriate consultation with interested parties. Justice through 
negotiation, on this fairly orthodox common law view, 101 is not a contradiction in terms. 
Cowdery rightly insists on disaggregating the nebulous — and somewhat emotive — term 
 ‘ plea  bargaining ’ 102 into the discreet institutional practices through which negotiated 
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 outcomes are actually secured in particular legal systems. Negotiations may focus on a range 
of variables (charges, facts, pleas) and be facilitated by widely differing procedures and 
incentives. Differentiated models of negotiated justice invite nuanced appraisal. Whilst the 
most plausible theoretical defences of guilty pleas tend to provide only qualifi ed defences of 
existing institutional practices, 103 Cowdery takes  ‘ the actuality of criminal proceedings, in 
which compromise is an embedded fact of life ’ , 104 as his baseline assumption. 
 How might integrity inform these perennial debates ? One of several methodologically 
instructive contrasts between these two chapters concerns the question of scale. McConville 
and Marsh address the  ‘ guilty plea system ’ as a whole, whereas Cowdery is ultimately con-
cerned with outcomes in particular cases (in a particular Australian state jurisdiction). Even 
on the pessimistic assumption that negotiated justice suffers from serious integrity defi cits, 
where does that leave conscientious practitioners in individual cases ? Should they resign or 
defect in protest ? Or strive to secure just outcomes within the scope of their professional 
discretion ? It would not follow from the fact that a justice system is broadly fair and legiti-
mate that it always achieves just outcomes in every case. Conversely, particular guilty plea 
agreements might appropriately serve the ends of justice even in an adjudicative system 
ultimately lacking integrity. So it seems that, for our heuristic purposes, we should conceive 
integrity as a relative and scalar virtue of particular practical contexts, rather than only 
an all-or-nothing attribute of entire criminal processes (though it could be that as well). 
Systems, institutions, organisations, policies, practices and actors may exhibit more, or less, 
integrity at particular points in time. Integrity ideals, moreover, should inspire improve-
ment without mocking feasibility, 105 not least because in the domain of criminal justice 
choosing not to act or decide means abandoning victims of injustice to their fate. As the 
essays by McConville and Marsh and Cowdery both demonstrate in their different ways, 
intelligent normative appraisal of negotiated justice must be critical, 106 informed, realistic 
and jurisdiction-specifi c; conducted, in other words, with intellectual integrity. 
 (b) Institutional and Remedial Integrity as Normative Coherence 
 A second interpretation of  ‘ the integrity principle ’ employs the integrity-as-wholeness trope 
to consider whether a particular aspect of criminal process, or the administration of crimi-
nal justice viewed in its entirety, achieves an integrated holistic integrity. One might apply 
this analysis to the principal agencies of criminal proceedings — police, prosecution, judici-
ary, etc — or to particular aspects of their policy, function or practice. We might then ask, for 
example, whether the policing of domestic violence (discussed by Stubbs in  Chapter 2) or 
interrogation policy and practice (Dixon ’ s topic in Chapter 3) are coherent with the general 
values and policies of the police organisation. Or in relation to prosecutorial practice, we 
might try to assess the normative coherence of plea negotiation (Cowdery in Chapter 5), 
charging policy (Gans in Chapter 6), pre-trial witness interviewing (Roberts in Chapter 7), 
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immunising accomplices (M Jackson in Chapter 8) or adducing expert witness testimony 
(Edmond in Chapter 9) with the advertised policies, standards and professional ethics of 
the organs of state prosecution. Criminal justice institutions and offi cials may lack integ-
rity, not only in the fi rst sense of failing to live up to advertised standards (hypocrisy), but 
alternatively (or also) in failing to present a unifi ed and integrated normative vision across 
their various departments, functions and activities (incoherence). 
 The internal normative coherence of particular criminal process agencies, divisions or 
departments should be a matter of concern to policymakers and senior administrators 
within those agencies or departments. Coherence at this microscopic or  ‘ local ’ level also 
equips researchers and scholars focusing on policing, prosecutions or the judiciary, etc with 
a critical standard for evaluating prevailing practices in each particular organisational set-
ting. The heuristic potential of integrity is greatly amplifi ed, however, when we consider the 
extent of normative coherence between different parts of the criminal process or in terms 
of the process as a whole. As with organs in the body or components of an engine, pro-
cedural integrity might be assessed piecemeal (examining each organ or component part 
separately), comparatively (considering two or more items together as a coherent package), 
or holistically, in terms of the overall health of the organism or the proper functioning of 
the machine. 
 Joanna Shapland once memorably characterised criminal proceedings as a sort of feudal 
economy, with each organ or agency jealously protecting its own jurisdiction and preroga-
tives largely in members ’ self-interest, leaving the disenfranchised peasants — complainants 
and witnesses — to fend for themselves. 107 Although the role and status of victims in crimi-
nal proceedings has improved somewhat in the ensuing three decades, 108 promoting effec-
tive inter-agency cooperation to achieve comprehensive criminal justice goals remains a 
central, and somewhat elusive, objective of criminal justice policymaking (as Stubbs also 
observes in relation to domestic violence policing in Chapter 2). To what extent, then, 
does procedural integrity as normative coherence presuppose effective collaboration and 
coordination between independent agencies and organisations in the criminal process 
neighbourhood ? 
 The institutional integrity of criminal process is a complex idea. It implies neither fric-
tionless normative coherence nor perfect institutional harmony on a day-to-day basis. 
Particularly within an adversarial procedural system premised on vigorous defence, exces-
sively cosy relationships between criminal practitioners might themselves be a form of 
corruption betraying a lack of institutional integrity. 109 Even in less avowedly adversarial 
procedural systems, however, relationships between professionals representing different 
parts of the process should be characterised by mutual respect for each other ’ s functionally 
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 differentiated roles rather than jovial collegiality, lest over-familiarity should breed a collu-
sive contempt for distinct professional roles and responsibilities. 110 Further complications 
arise from the  hierarchical nature of some of these relationships. The Public Law principles 
elucidated by Young in  Chapter 1 underpin the legitimacy of judicial review of administra-
tive action as a concrete institutional expression of the Rule of Law. The principle of judicial 
review itself, albeit open to competing interpretations and varying degrees of intensity, 111 
is unexceptional in liberal political theory. But this still leaves plenty of scope for jurisdic-
tional competition and vigorous debate at the level of practice. 
 The question of the proper scope of judicial review of criminal prosecutions is posed by 
Cowdery in Chapter 5. The starting point for any legal system respecting the accusatorial 
principle (that is, the functional separation of adjudication from prosecution, in contrast 
to the all-purpose medieval inquisitor or modern coroner) must be that prosecutors pros-
ecute allegations of criminality and courts judge them; that notwithstanding the hierarchi-
cal seniority of the judiciary, the prosecutor is — as the Scots and civilians say — ‘ master 
of the instance ’ . 112 Of course, it does not follow from possession of an authentic original 
jurisdiction that prosecutorial decision-making involves completely unreviewable exercises 
of discretion. Cowdery shows, for example, that plea and charge negotiations in New South 
Wales are regulated by a principled set of standards and accompanied by procedural duties 
(including duties to consult with victims and police) which courts sometimes enforce, 
in the name of integrity. This discussion is extended in  Chapter 6 through Jeremy Gans ’ 
detailed critical analysis of Australian and other common law authorities specifying the 
legitimate scope of judicial review of prosecutors ’ charging decisions. The topic is arcane, 
but not without intermittent media and public interest. 113 The leading Australian authority 
is  Maxwell , 114 to which Gans administers a forensic hammering. The Australian High Court 
in  Maxwell expressly invoked the  ‘ integrity of the judicial process ’ 115 as its motivation for 
restricting judicial interventions into prosecutors ’ charging decisions. Gans is unimpressed: 
partly because the Court seemed to have judicial self-interest at heart, but mainly because —
 as Gans ’ extended analysis demonstrates — common law courts, whatever they might  say , 
routinely employ a variety of doctrinal categories and strategies to constrain prosecutorial 
discretion, at least where the facts are capable of satisfying a range of overlapping offence 
defi nitions. Here, appeals to  ‘ integrity ’ strike the discordant tone of empty judicial rhetoric. 
 Comprehensive conceptions of normative coherence imply what we might characterise as 
 ‘ remedial integrity ’ . Injustice unremedied — justice delayed  indefi nitely — is a fortiori justice 
denied. In the service of integrity, criminal process should make appropriate institutional 
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provision for correcting the errors which are a foreseeable, and in aggregate unavoidable, 
consequence of human fallibility in the administration of justice. An obvious example is 
the provision for defence appeals against conviction or sentence, today widely recognised 
as integral to the fundamental right to fair trial, 116 albeit a relatively recent innovation in 
the historical evolution of criminal adjudication. 117 Remedial integrity must balance fl ex-
ibility, rigour and accuracy in decision-making against the cost and fi nality of authoritative 
verdicts and judgments. It would hardly serve the ends of justice to allow appeals against 
appeals against appeals, and onwards to infi nite regress. 118 Nor can collateral challenges or 
 ‘ satellite litigation ’ be permitted to spiral out of control and gobble up resources that could 
more profi tably be devoted to other, more deserving causes. 119 When criminal justice budg-
ets are fi xed, and indeed shrinking, remedial integrity is a zero-sum game. 
 Remedial integrity poses the question of the extent to which different parts of the crimi-
nal process may be held accountable for the errors or misbehaviour of other parts of the 
process, and for correcting their mistakes. One might think that responsibility is limited to 
direct institutional failings; that agencies and offi cials are accountable only for their own 
(mis)conduct without also having to answer vicariously for others ’ misdeeds. On this view, 
for example, the notion of a  ‘ fair trial ’ refers only to what takes place in the courtroom, 
leaving alleged offi cial improprieties or failings at earlier — or later — stages of criminal 
proceedings to be addressed through alternative procedural mechanisms and remedies. 120 
Alternatively, one might regard criminal proceedings as a single continuous process for 
which the state is ultimately responsible, notwithstanding liberal constitutional doctrines 
insisting on the separation of powers. This is the view encouraged by integrity as normative 
coherence. It suggests, for example, that gross impropriety in criminal investigations may 
so taint what comes later in the process that it is simply impossible, normatively speaking, 
for just punishment to be imposed on a guilty offender. The state, through its miscreant 
agents, has effectively forfeited its legitimate authority to judge and punish. The recent pro-
gress of integrity as an infl uential jurisprudential principle in many common law systems 
is chiefl y attributable to a major shift in judicial thinking, from the fi rst model of criminal 
adjudication in which balkanised institutional fi efdoms are allowed to proclaim  ‘ we are not 
our brother ’ s keeper ’ , to the second model of collective institutional responsibility for the 
morality of criminal proceedings. 121 The jurisprudential scaffolding for remedial integrity 
in criminal trials has mainly been supplied through developments of two traditional com-
mon law procedural mechanisms: the fi rst, a rejuvenated doctrine of abuse of process, is 
described by Amanda Whitfort in Chapter 10; the second, evidentiary exclusion of improp-
erly obtained evidence, is Peter Chau ’ s topic in Chapter 11. 
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 Whitfort surveys recent abuse of process jurisprudence in Hong Kong, Australia and the 
UK, drawing out several key points of continuity and comparison. Arguments over abuse 
of process have taken place in high profi le cases, and produced a fair amount of dissonance 
between appellate courts ’ judgments and fi rst instance rulings. Judicial decision-making in 
this context seems especially unpredictable and uncertain, even with regard to its under-
pinning rationales (for example, is disciplining the police ever a legitimate objective for a 
judge considering whether to impose a stay ? ) and operative legal tests. Whitfort helpfully 
draws together the main precepts that can be extracted from this evolving Commonwealth 
jurisprudence, but it is hard not to see in this  ‘ principled guidance ’ a collection of rather 
disparate, open-ended, frequently rhetorical 122 and completely indeterminate prescrip-
tions lacking any strong internal coherence and ripe for judicial manipulation in concrete 
cases. Perhaps the jurisprudence is still underdeveloped at this stage; possibly, the psycho-
logical imperative of convicting serious offenders even where  ‘ the constable has blundered ’ 
(or worse) will inevitably win out in the vast majority of disputes whatever the formal 
procedural rule is supposed to be. The need for general principles to be fl exible enough to 
accommodate subtle variations in the material facts and circumstances of individual cases 
is also an important, sometimes overlooked or under-appreciated, constraint on the speci-
fi cation of procedural norms. 123 
 Chau, in the following chapter, revisits the underlying rationales for excluding improp-
erly obtained evidence from criminal trials. More specifi cally, Chau is concerned with  non-
consequentialist rationales for exclusion, ie those that seek to justify exclusion on intrinsic 
rather than instrumental (typically epistemic) grounds. The evidence should be excluded, 
when it should, not because it is (probably) unreliable and may therefore lead to a factually 
incorrect determination, but  for some other (non-consequentialist) reason . Judicially artic-
ulated rationales for exclusion embrace, and sometimes blend together, consequentialist 
and non-consequentialist (deontological) thinking. The motivation might be, for example, 
deterrence of future offi cial misconduct, vindicating rights and remedying their breaches, 
serving the internal logic of procedural due process (or some aspect of it), or upholding the 
moral integrity of the proceedings and thereby preserving the legitimacy of trial  verdicts. 
Although this is fairly well charted territory for Evidence scholars, 124 Chau moves the 
debate forward in two signifi cant respects. First, his terse recapitulation and juxtaposition 
of familiar arguments opens up established rationalisations to closer critical examination. 
Secondly, Chau draws attention to the relatively untapped potential of the idea of unjust 
enrichment as a source of non-consequentialist reasons for excluding improperly obtained 
evidence. His chapter presents an outline sketch of the  ‘ no profi t principle ’ as a rival or 
 supplement to integrity-based exclusionary rationales. It is an imaginative proposal worthy 
of further elucidation and critical scrutiny. 
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 What are the temporal limits of remedial integrity ? Bitter experience of miscarriages of 
justice in recent decades — the latest chapters in a very long story 125 — indicates why criminal 
verdicts cannot always be fi nal even after the normal appeals process has run its course. In 
the book ’ s concluding pair of essays, Charles Weisselberg and Carolyn Hoyle canvass issues 
bearing on the integrity of post-conviction procedures for dealing with alleged miscarriages 
of justice. Weisselberg, in  Chapter 15 , is concerned with the perils of emphasising  ‘ actual 
innocence ’ in appeals against conviction. Of course it is not disputed that criminal proceed-
ings should strive to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction. However, the extensive 
information marshalled by Weisselberg describing the activities of Innocence Projects, state 
commissions of inquiry and wider debates around miscarriages of justice and law reform 
in the USA 126 highlights the risks associated with treating  ‘ actual innocence ’ as the sole or 
predominant criterion for reviewing and, where necessary, remedying institutional failings. 
Over-concentration on factual innocence can lead to an excessively outcome-orientated 
instrumentalisation of criminal adjudication, which fails to address fl awed or faulty offi -
cial practices (treating the symptoms rather than the underlying causes) and marginalises 
process values of the type emphasised, for example, by Whitfort and Chau. It risks, in other 
words, systemic normative incoherence. Weisselberg explores these themes particularly 
in relation to unreliable confessions and the (disputed) practical signifi cance of the US 
Supreme Court ’ s iconic ruling in  Miranda v Arizona . 127 
 In  Chapter 16 , Hoyle investigates persistent shortcomings in arrangements for providing 
state compensation to victims of miscarriages of justice. This is a topic with cosmopolitan 
 resonance, 128 which has also generated policy discussion and recent case law in England 
and Wales. 129 By way of context, Hoyle reviews institutional developments stretching back 
to the creation of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1907, but focussing more particularly 
on the work of the Criminal Cases Review Commission since 1997. 130 She notes the for-
mal distinction between  ‘ not guilty ’ verdicts or quashed convictions following a successful 
appeal and positive declarations of  innocence , and describes a handful of rare instances in 
which appellate courts went beyond their strictly legal remit and actually apologised to vic-
tims of miscarriages of justice. The problem, as Hoyle observes, with such doubtless well-
motivated but selective and very infrequent departures from the Court of Appeal ’ s formal 
jurisdiction, is that there is a danger of creating  de facto a two tier system of acquittals:  ‘ fi rst 
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class ’ acquittals of the truly innocent, and decidedly inferior acquittals of individuals who 
(to exaggerate only slightly)  ‘ might well have been guilty but were given the benefi t of the 
doubt or got off on a technicality ’ . 
 Applications for state compensation by those claiming to be victims of miscarriages of 
justice have crystallised this issue, because English courts and policymakers have always 
resisted the idea that compensation should be paid automatically to anybody whose con-
viction is fi nally quashed on appeal. What was formally an entirely discretionary e x gratia 
compensation scheme was subsequently placed on a statutory footing, and recent litiga-
tion has centred on the meaning of the statutory test for establishing eligibility for com-
pensation. Hoyle retells the tale in detail. She is hostile to an  ‘ actual innocence ’ standard, 
partly for the principled reasons advanced by Weisselberg in the preceding chapter, but 
also on pragmatic grounds. Whilst factual innocence may be diffi cult to ascertain reliably 
at the best of times, the Court of Appeal is a particularly unsuitable venue for attempting 
such determinations. The practical constraints, normative legal framework and forensic 
strategies of criminal appeals preclude, or at least strongly discourage, the presentation 
of evidence capable of proving actual innocence. Appellants rarely need to provide such 
information to succeed in their appeals. In this procedural environment  ‘ actual innocence ’ 
would operate as an uncertain and quite possibly capricious standard. It would fail to meet 
threshold requirements of rationality in adjudication, 131 and therefore lack integrity in the 
sense of cohering with an integrated scheme of basic values. Hoyle also canvasses a more 
local (and controversial) potential source of normative incoherence: are  de facto second 
class ( ‘ not actually innocent ’ ) acquittals compatible with the presumption of innocence ? 
Not on her account. 
 Without any pretence to comprehensiveness, the contributors to this volume range 
widely over the terrain of criminal investigations, prosecutions, trials, appeals and 
 post-conviction remedies. We claim, and hope in the following pages to have demonstrated 
through numerous examples, that it is illuminating to consider whether existing law and 
practice in relation to any particular criminal process institution, phase, stage or functional 
operation is coherent, and at least in that sense has  ‘ integrity ’ , in its own terms and viewed 
holistically, as a constituent part of the administration of criminal justice. A police force 
that routinely accepted bribes to drop criminal charges whilst planting incriminating evi-
dence on unforthcoming suspects would obviously lack integrity. But so, too, would charg-
ing practices that systematically failed to refl ect the gravity of criminal wrongdoing, or a 
plea bargaining system incompatible with the presumption of innocence, or procedures 
for assessing demeanour at trial that resulted in discriminatory or unfair punishments 
being meted out to offenders. These aberrations do not necessarily involve departures from 
advertised policies or legal standards or exhibit the crasser forms of hypocrisy mentioned in 
the previous subsection. Rather, they suffer from a more profound normative  incoherence, 
in being ultimately incompatible with a defensible conception of criminal justice. More 
localised incoherence is seen where a particular institutional policy, process or norm is 
self-defeating in its own terms. Anticipating John Jackson ’ s argument in  Chapter 12 , it 
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would be irrational, for example, to insist on unreasoned jury verdicts in the name of pre-
serving public confi dence in criminal adjudication, if the failure to provide reasons came 
to be regarded as incompatible with the right to a fair trial and itself a source of widespread 
public criticism and dissatisfaction. The traditional practice would have shrivelled into a 
hollow husk, devoid of institutional integrity. 
 Promoting an ideal of integrity as  ‘ normative coherence ’ does not deny the pervasiveness 
of competition between norms or the practical inevitability of jurisprudential loose ends 
and moral remainders.  Perfect normative coherence is a Platonic chimera. Nor are we falling 
into the category error of thinking that questions of normative evaluation can be answered 
 purely through methodological innovation or conceptual refi nements. Value confl icts are an 
inherent, routine and — in gross 132 — irremediable feature of criminal proceedings. Whether 
we are thinking about the tension between securing fair trials for the accused and appropri-
ate concern and respect for victims and witnesses, or calculating the costs to truth-fi nding 
of excluding improperly obtained evidence, or calibrating the delicate balance between 
fi nality in adjudication and correcting miscarriages of justice,  ‘ integrity ’ offers a heuristic 
for managing normative complexity rather than a whitewash for concealing its existence. 
In the following pages the reader will fi nd many more illustrations of institutional moral 
dilemmas and tragic choices, where the righteous path of integrity may be circuitous, over-
grown and diffi cult to discern and abide. 
 (c) Epistemological Integrity: Evidence, Proof and Legal Narratives 
 It is a minimum requirement for any plausible and normatively attractive conception of 
criminal adjudication that it should take fact-fi nding seriously; that it should strive, in 
other words, to convict the guilty but acquit the innocent. On traditional accounts, moreo-
ver, it is not acceptable to pursue more convictions of the guilty by creating disproportion-
ately greater risks of wrongfully convicting the innocent. 133 Orthodoxy in this regard has 
not gone unchallenged. 134 However this  normative balance might be struck, the rationality 
of proof and accurate fact-fi nding always ultimately rests on the integrity of the processes 
by which evidence is generated, collected, preserved, interpreted, packaged, presented, 
tested, challenged and, fi nally, evaluated by the fact-fi nder (and possibly re-evaluated dur-
ing appeals and post-conviction procedures). The integrity of evidence is a third prominent 
theme of this book, refl ecting — and more broadly contextualising — professional legal dis-
course around preserving  ‘ the continuity of evidence ’ 135 and fi delity to truth in litigation. 136 
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 As before, it is easy to think of instances where the evidential process  lacks integrity, 
including cases of deliberate tampering or perjury, and extending to cultured  ‘ testilying ’ 137 
in all its shades and manifestations. However, as the essays in this volume show, preserving 
and authenticating the integrity of evidence-generating processes can be a subtle and mul-
tifaceted endeavour, demanding expertise and professional judgement. Judicial  ‘ evidence ’ 
is properly conceptualised as a  ‘ constructed ’ entity, in the sense of being an intentional 
product of human decision making, interactions and institutionalised processes. Whether 
we are thinking about police interrogation strategies (Dixon), or prosecutors interview-
ing complainants or other potential prosecution witnesses (Roberts) or negotiating with 
erstwhile accomplices to secure their testimonial cooperation (M Jackson), or the processes 
and practical routines for generating expert evidence (Edmond) — in each of these practical 
contexts, as well as in many others, evidence is a crafted artefact of its institutionalised pro-
duction. Whether it is a  carefully crafted product — and, indeed, what this nicely ambiguous 
phrase might mean and entail in practice — are contingent matters to be investigated, both 
at the aggregated level of routine procedures and with regard to particular cases. 
 Conceding the sociological truth of evidence  ‘ construction ’ opens the way to nuanced 
(normative and descriptive) inquiries concerning the epistemological integrity of judicial 
evidence and proof. Are particular procedures, processes or practices truth-conducive, or 
alternatively, liable to frustrate forensic truth-fi nding ? This is often a disputed question. 
Coercive police interrogation poses obvious risks of false confession, but aren ’ t arrest, 
detention and interrogation  inherently coercive ? If so, why not disqualify  all extrajudicial 
confessions as automatically inadmissible at trial ? It is already settled practice in many 
common law jurisdictions for prosecutors to interview key witnesses as a routine aspect 
of thorough trial preparation. 138 But if evidence is produced through interactions, is there 
not a risk that rehearsing a witness ’ s evidence will  change it ? At what point does legitimate 
witness preparation become illegitimate  ‘ coaching ’ ? Paul Roberts explores these issues in 
 Chapter 7 , in the light of signifi cant developments in English law and practice following 
the introduction of  ‘ pre-trial witness interviews ’ (PTWI). 139 And it goes without saying 
that doing deals with accomplices is an ethical minefi eld. Supping with the devil requires 
a long spoon. We should ask whether prosecutors ’ metaphorical cutlery is long enough to 
preserve the integrity of fact-fi nding, despite inviting courts to rely on the testimony of 
witnesses with such obvious incentives to lie, and who often possess insider-knowledge 
enabling them to do so effectively. 140 Michael Jackson revisits these epistemic challenges 
and assesses institutional responses to them, from a Hong Kong perspective, in Chapter 8. 
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 Expert evidence introduces further epistemological complexities, which are tackled by 
Gary Edmond in Chapter 9. Law and Science can be conceptualised as  alternative systems 
of practical epistemic authority, which can often be combined successfully (think about the 
power of DNA evidence or modern forensic medicine in contemporary criminal proceed-
ings) but also sometimes compete in forensically problematic ways. 141 Judicial reliance on 
science, through the medium of expert evidence, has a very long and somewhat chequered 
history in the common law. 142 Edmond takes up the story of recent critical examinations 
of forensic science and forensic medicine, which have exposed the quite startling extent to 
which routine forensic procedures lack secure foundations in rigorous scientifi c method. 143 
More worryingly still, the traditional tools of adversarial trial, cross-examination and 
defence counter-expertise have patently failed to expose fl aws and fallibilities in prosecu-
tion evidence, leading to miscarriages of justice. 144 Having identifi ed the true extent of the 
epistemological challenge for criminal adjudication presented by modern forensic science 
and forensic medical evidence, Edmond ’ s essay draws out further institutional implications 
for the professional responsibilities of prosecutors, defence lawyers and courts. 
 In addition to considering the epistemological integrity of evidence and proof, we can 
also interrogate the integrity of broader criminal process narratives from an epistemologi-
cal perspective. Symbolically and literally, criminal process tells culturally resonant  ‘ stories ’ 
about crime and punishment. But are these  true stories, or only convenient, media-friendly 
or fi ctionalised accounts, singing to the tune of powerful social interests rather than fac-
tual verisimilitude ? For example, what kind of story do the no-drop policies discussed by 
Stubbs in  Chapter 2 relate about domestic violence ? The charging policies and plea nego-
tiations examined by McConville and Marsh (Chapter 4), Cowdery (Chapter 5) and Gans 
(Chapter 6) play a vital role in framing the offence to be tried, ensuring (or not) that the 
punishment fi ts the crime in the event of a conviction. Whether or not narratives of crime 
and punishment generated by high volume guilty pleas retain epistemological integrity 
goes to the heart of disputes between critics and defenders of plea-bargaining. Are those 
pleading guilty  actually guilty of  the offence charged ? To the extent that guilty pleas may be 
facilitated — or possibly dictated — by suspects ’ custodial confessions, the factual distortions 
potentially introduced by defi cient police interrogation techniques, such as those criticised 
by Dixon in  Chapter 3 , are all the more troubling in this regard. Later in the progress of 
contested proceedings, judicial rulings on procedural submissions or the admissibility of 
evidence, such as those considered by Whitfort (Chapter 10) and Chau (Chapter 11), tell 
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their own stories about the values embedded in criminal adjudication, revealing judicial 
priorities when those values confl ict or threaten the effi cacy of criminal prosecutions. 
 A contested trial might be thought of as a kind of tournament of narratives, often vying 
against each other but sometimes proceeding in parallel or even in collaboration, for offi cial 
recognition and authentication. A trial verdict is a narrative whose epistemic integrity is 
warranted by offi cial endorsement. This legitimising relationship is contingent but, ide-
ally, mutually reinforcing: the truth of the verdict is guaranteed by the integrity of the trial 
process, just as the integrity of the trial process is confi rmed by the truth of its particu-
larised verdicts. Conversely, the currency of criminal proceedings lacking integrity is false 
verdicts and miscarriages of justice. Although institutional details are partly a function of 
procedural tradition and will necessarily (and often harmlessly) vary across time and space, 
the manner in which verdicts and judgments are delivered and their detailed content will 
always be signifi cant variables under the lens of epistemological integrity. 
 In  Chapter 12 , John Jackson revisits the question whether, in the modern era of human 
rights law, a growing expectation that important public decision-making should be explicitly 
reasoned and justifi ed should be extended to impose associated obligations on the criminal 
trial jury. After all, formulating and publicising reasons for important decisions are widely 
regarded as minimal criteria of rationality and prime judicial responsibilities. Yet juries 
deliberate in secret and give no reasons to justify their determinations. 145 This has generally 
been seen as an important guarantor of fi nality in verdicts, even by those with impeccable 
rationalist credentials. 146 As Jackson describes, however, modern realities — both techno-
logical and juridical — seemingly call into question the extent to which tried-and-tested 
procedural approaches will be suffi cient to sustain the legitimacy and public acceptability 
of unreasoned verdicts. Procedural innovation may be required to enable juries to live up to 
contemporary demands, underpinned by European human rights law, 147 for transparency, 
rationality, fairness and accountability in their deliberations and verdicts. The implications 
for the integrity of criminal adjudication could hardly be more profound. Are juries on the 
traditional common law model  capable of meeting novel expectations for a more  ‘ judicial ’ 
style of decision-making ? Which procedural changes are necessary, and how are they to be 
designed and implemented ? Supposing that Jackson is right about the current direction of 
travel, will the model of criminal adjudication that emerges constitute a sensible and neces-
sary development of our existing (and always evolving) procedural traditions, or a decisive 
break with the past heralding a new kind of  ‘ jury verdict ’ for the twenty-fi rst century ? 
 In  Chapter 13 , Susan Bandes embarks upon a different kind of epistemological inquiry. 
Her topic is the role of remorse in criminal adjudication. This sounds like a normative 
issue for sentencing and punishment, and some of the material Bandes considers does 
indeed relate to the sentencing phases of US criminal trials, including death penalty hear-
ings determined by juries. However, the methodological foundations of Bandes ’ discus-
sion, which draws extensively on behavioural science and psychological research, are more 
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generic and far-reaching. By posing the question whether  ‘ remorse ’ in the juridically rel-
evant sense actually exists as a tangible practical emotion, Bandes opens up issues that 
are at once both conceptual and epistemological. How does one know when a convicted 
offender is ( genuinely) remorseful ? Since contrition in the courtroom must invariably be 
inferred from demeanour — with or without accompanying words of apology — infusing 
remorse with legal signifi cance is vulnerable to similar behavioural science criticisms as can 
be made of orthodox legal rationales for inviting jurors to infer veracity and reliability, or 
their opposites, from witnesses ’ testimonial demeanour. 148 This is especially problematic, as 
Bandes notes, where stereotypical or culturally blinkered expectations are liable to reinforce 
prejudice or unfair discrimination. But even where these particular concerns do not arise, 
legal procedures should be astute to ensure that fi ndings of remorsefulness (or its absence) 
are epistemically well warranted;  and that fact-fi nders ’ informal judgements of remorseless-
ness (or other inappropriate or forensically damaging emotions) do not seep into verdicts 
and contaminate the integrity of criminal trials. 
 Having reviewed the relevant cognitive science literature, Bandes is sceptical about the 
robustness of evaluations of remorse in criminal trials, and this in turn leads her to recom-
mend curtailing the infl uence of such shaky assessments on decision making in criminal 
adjudication, insofar as this is practically feasible. Normative arguments about the sali-
ence of remorse for questions of legal culpability, sentencing or punishment are idle, or in 
bad faith, unless  ‘ remorse ’ can be defi ned and reliably identifi ed, in the context of crimi-
nal prosecutions and trials, with epistemological integrity. This pattern of argumentation, 
underpinned by research in the cognitive and behavioural sciences, might be extended to 
challenge the epistemic integrity of legal fact-fi nding in relation to other emotions or prac-
tical attitudes associated with standards of criminal responsibility or criteria of aggravation 
or mitigation at sentencing. It also implies an interdisciplinary research programme for 
scholars with relevant skills and interests. 149 
 Jill Hunter, in  Chapter 14 , likewise draws upon literatures outside the law to develop a 
counter-narrative to legal orthodoxy. The focus now shifts from fi rst instance trials to appel-
late court judgments. In contrast to jury verdicts, which are the paradigmatic form of legal 
decision-making for Jackson and Bandes in the preceding two chapters, criminal appeals 
 do , at least ostensibly, provide detailed rationalisations for their conclusions. Hunter ’ s criti-
cal deconstruction of one judgment of the High Court of Australia 150 grapples with mul-
tiple, intersecting narratives of contemporary doctrinal analysis, historical jurisprudence, 
and gender inequality, implicitly inviting further refl ection on the range of audiences to 
which legal judgments — especially those delivered by constitutional or apex courts — might 
conceivably be addressed. Like Gans in  Chapter 6 , Hunter ’ s discussion proceeds from what 
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might initially appear to be a fairly technical doctrinal question, in the context of allega-
tions of  ‘ historic ’ sexual offending: was it a crime in 1963 for a man in South Australia 
to rape his wife ? The majority of the High Court concluded it was, and Hunter does not 
directly contest the legitimacy of that conclusion. Her critique of the majority judgments 
centres on the  arguments and  information deployed to reach it, and the symbolic messages 
the judgment conveys to multiple audiences. 
 Specifi cally, Hunter argues that the High Court majority ’ s resort to formalistic common 
law reasoning effectively airbrushes the true narrative of married women ’ s lack of pro-
tection from sexual violence, in both substantive criminal law and prosecutorial practice 
(echoing a theme developed by Stubbs in Chapter 2); and that the Court was indefensibly 
recalcitrant to being better informed by readily available social scientifi c data indicating the 
realities of women ’ s inequality before the law, extending far beyond the defi nitions of sexual 
offences and more recently in time than 1963. Just as the fairness of trials cannot be reduced 
to the accuracy of verdicts, Hunter ’ s critical discussion demonstrates that the integrity of 
appellate judgment-writing is not simply a question of reaching the  ‘ right ’ result. There are 
(even) bigger themes lurking here, pertaining to technology, democracy and the place of 
law in society. Within living memory, appellate court judgments were the preserve of dusty 
library bookshelves and technical interpretations by the legal priesthood. In the internet 
age, the pronouncements of appeal (especially apex) courts are now part of the law ’ s imme-
diately accessible public profi le. This novel kind of exposure to  ‘ the laity ’ inevitably brings 
with it new demands and expectations of judgment-writing with integrity, which courts 
cannot ignore if public confi dence in the judiciary is to be maintained. 
 Provision for appeals and exceptional post-conviction review refl ects the level of a 
 particular legal system ’ s commitment not only to correcting apparent factual errors, but 
also its willingness to contemplate fallibility in the fi rst place and to facilitate proactive 
remedial measures in an effort to set the record straight. However, as Weisselberg shows 
in  Chapter 15 , focussing on unvarnished  ‘ actual innocence ’ is not unproblematic for the 
administration of criminal justice, even if considered in purely epistemic terms. One rea-
son for caution is that, by implicitly appearing to condone offi cial illegality in order to 
uphold convictions of the guilty, truth-fi nding in future proceedings may be compromised 
(for example, because investigative practices eroding evidential reliability become routi-
nised and unchallenged), even if factual accuracy is not undermined in the instant case. 
Further exploring the normative gap between  ‘ acquittal ’ and  ‘ innocence ’ , in the volume ’ s 
fi nal chapter, Hoyle elucidates the narrative implications of denying monetary compensa-
tion to those whose convictions have been quashed following long sentences of imprison-
ment. How are we supposed to read the offi cial truth of these cases, in which the prisoner is 
released and the conviction expunged, yet the courts still refuse to award compensation or 
even to issue an offi cial apology ? 
 Thinking about criminal process in terms of its epistemological integrity demands no 
less sophistication than trying to assess its adherence to advertised policy or prescriptive 
standards, modelling institutional coherence, or evaluating conformity with more com-
prehensive procedural ideals.  ‘ Finding the truth ’ is far from a simple, reductive idea. 151 
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Even at the granular level of individual pieces of evidence, the notion of evidential integrity 
is complex (though it can certainly be compromised in entirely prosaic ways), 152 owing to 
the inherently constructed nature of judicial evidence and proof, the meshing of empirical 
and normative considerations, and the variety of institutional and social contexts in which 
facts are investigated, presented, disputed, evaluated and pronounced. When the analytical 
lens is widened to accommodate the plurality of competing and contested criminal process 
narratives, the adaptable concept of epistemological integrity can be deployed to illuminate 
the darker recesses of legal storytelling in, and about, proof, truth and fact-fi nding in crimi-
nal adjudication. 
 (d) Personal and Professional Integrity 
 In one tangible sense, the integrity of criminal process always comes down to the integ-
rity of the professionals who operate it. Institutions, processes and procedures are not self-
actuating , but rather represent an aggregation of human decision-making and concerted 
activity. Our fourth conception of criminal process integrity, as the personal and profes-
sional integrity of the men and women involved in the administration of criminal justice, 
might, then, just as easily have been our analytical point of departure. 
 The choices of individual police offi cers, 153 prosecutors 154 or even judges 155 to take bribes, 
plant evidence or otherwise deliberately subvert the proper administration of justice are 
obvious failings of personal and professional integrity, which by extension also threaten the 
integrity of criminal process at large. Partly owing to the special responsibilities with which 
offi cials are entrusted, their wrongdoing may be diffi cult to detect or prove. This calls for 
robust institutional mechanisms for monitoring, deterring and exposing offi cial corrup-
tion and other wrongdoing. It also demands effective institutional checks and balances, not 
only in terms of intelligent institutional design (addressed, in particular, by M Jackson in 
Chapter 8), but also in the sense that individual practitioners must rise to the challenge of 
Introduction  31
 156  Assuming the  ‘ normal ’ functioning of a broadly legitimate criminal process. Whether, for example, a judge 
in a racist legal system should resign or use their position to promote equality raises altogether different (exis-
tential) questions of personal and professional integrity: cf  D  Dyzenhaus ,  Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves 
( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  1998 ) . On related questions of the integrity of positive law, see  D  Fraser ,  Law after 
 Auschwitz:  Towards a Jurisprudence of the Holocaust ( Durham NC ,  Carolina Academic Press ,  2005 ) . 
 157  See eg  CG  Gerstein and  JJ  Prescott ,  ‘ Process Costs and Police Discretion ’ ( 2015 )  128  Harvard Law Review 
Forum  268, 271 – 72 ( ‘ substantive law is mostly irrelevant to the matter of police discretion ’ , referring specifi cally 
to minor public order offending);  S  Portillo and  DS  Rudes ,  ‘ Construction of Justice at the Street Level ’ ( 2014 ) 
 10  Annual Review of Law and Social Science  321 ;  DA  Harris ,  ‘ The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law :  Why  “ Driv-
ing While Black ” Matters ’ ( 1999 )  84  Minnesota Law Review  265, 269, 319 (concluding that  ‘ offi cers are free, for 
all practical purposes, to act on the assumption that being black increases the probability that an individual is 
a criminal ’ , such that  ‘ “ [d]riving while black ” has begun to threaten the integrity of the entire process ’ ). Gener-
ally, see  D  Dixon ,  Law in Policing ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  1997 ) ;  R  Reiner (ed),  Policing II ( Aldershot , 
 Dartmouth ,  1996 ) . 
 158  Also see  J  Sanders ,  ‘ Expert Witness Ethics ’ ( 2007 )  76  Fordham Law Review  1539 . 
discharging their designated institutional responsibilities skilfully and courageously. This 
applies, perforce, to the judicial responsibility to review the legality of all administrative 
action, a cornerstone of the rule of law in common law jurisdictions, as restated in general 
terms by Young in  Chapter 1 and applied to judicial supervision of prosecutorial discretion 
by Cowdery (Chapter 5) and Gans (Chapter 6). Judicial willingness to visit illegality in the 
conduct of criminal investigations and prosecution with appropriate sanctions, including 
evidentiary exclusion, is another signifi cant factor in this discussion, explored by Whitfort 
(Chapter 10) and Chau (Chapter 11), amongst others, in this volume. 
 This is not to say that institutional failings can always be laid wholly or directly at the 
door of individual miscreants. The conduct of criminal proceedings involves coordinated 
collective action. Individual practitioners operate within a framework of law, organisational 
policies and embedded routines and practices, which properly structure and constrain their 
individual preferences and judgements. Frontline practitioners may bear little personal 
responsibility for faithfully implementing their organisation ’ s policies in accordance with 
its published objectives and priorities 156 (though the same cannot necessarily be said for 
organisational leaders and their senior managers). Tensions between personal conviction 
and fi delity to professional duty may induce confl icts of loyalty, complicating the notion of 
acting with personal  and professional integrity. This is a subplot of Hunter ’ s critical discus-
sion of judicial law-making in Chapter 14. Whistleblowers may be obliged to betray their 
friends and comrades in order to expose offi cial wrongdoing. As Dixon cautions in  Chapter 3 , 
 ‘ integrity ’ is not necessarily to be celebrated if it refers only to a self-defensive  ‘ blue wall of 
silence ’ or, in broader terms, an impoverished criminal process committed to protecting 
 ‘ its own ’ from external criticism and defending the existing social order at almost any cost. 
 It nonetheless remains an undeniable feature of criminal process that frontline offi cials 
retain signifi cant spheres of personal operational discretion to exercise, as they deem fi t, on 
a day-to-day basis. This is notoriously true of routine street policing, as ethnographers con-
tinually rediscover. 157 In this volume, with its topical inclination towards litigated cases, it 
is prosecutorial discretion that looms particularly large, especially in the essays by  Cowdery, 
Gans, Roberts and M Jackson (Chapters 5 to 8). Edmond, in  Chapter 9 , introduces the 
further complicating factor of expert witnesses ’ professional ethical responsibilities. 158 An 
important methodological moral to be drawn from these discussions concerns the under-
appreciated theoretical signifi cance of codes of professional ethics, alongside other  ‘ soft 
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law ’ instruments, for the conduct and supervision of criminal proceedings. Whilst primary 
legislation and appellate case law tend to dominate academic discussion and legal educa-
tion, legal practitioners are often more directly concerned with codes of practice, internal 
guidelines,  ‘ working rules ’ and local cultures of practice as normative resources structuring 
and guiding their discretionary decision-making. 159 
 Professional legal ethics are too often assimilated to a list of mandatory directives for 
rote-learning by practitioners. Ethical practice should instead be conceptualised, and 
taught to practitioners, as a complex interface between abstract normative requirements 
and their concrete, contextualised applications, which professionals are obliged to negotiate 
for themselves under the aegis of integrity. 160 Ethical legal practice is functionally differen-
tiated, the more so in an adversarial procedural system. 161 The duties of the prosecutor, as 
representative of the public interest and conscripted  ‘ minister of justice ’ (see Cowdery in 
Chapter 5), are not coterminous with zealous representation of the accused, as Edmond 
(Chapter 9) also argues. Although none of our contributors affords systematic considera-
tion to the ethics of criminal defence, the professional duties of defence lawyers crop up in 
relation to custodial police interviews with suspects (Dixon), negotiated pleas (McConville 
and Marsh), and adversarial challenges to expert evidence (Edmond). Concepts of profes-
sional integrity are further complicated by the appearance of criminal justice profession-
als embedded in alternative systems of practical authority and ethical responsibility. One 
thinks here of the forensic pathologist answerable to the dictates of medical ethics, as well 
as, more generally, of any expert witness committed to upholding scientifi c standards of 
validity, objectivity and non-partisanship. The integrity of criminal proceedings as a whole 
rests on the possibility of keeping potentially confl icting professional loyalties in produc-
tive tension, without allowing any one occupational group to dominate or to disrupt the 
normative equilibrium, but also without leaving any  ‘ dead zones ’ in the coverage of profes-
sional responsibility. Circumstances of overlapping ethical duty can paradoxically conduce 
to ethical  irresponsibility , as where everybody assumes (or too easily allows themselves to 
believe) that proactively managing the integrity of the process is ultimately  ‘ somebody else ’ s 
business ’ whilst systemic failures in the meantime are  ‘ not my fault ’ . 
 Critical discussion of personal integrity in criminal process is not exhausted by pro-
fessionals ’ ethical obligations. Indeed, one might think that offi cials are really only the 
supporting cast. The primary actors in criminal proceedings are laypeople, in the guise 
of suspects, offenders, complainants, victims and witnesses. Do we expect even criminal 
defendants to play their designated role with integrity ? In a sense, we do. After all, accused 
who elect to testify in their own defence take an oath (or affi rm) to tell the truth under 
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sanction of  perjury, 162 theoretical though the threat of prosecution for advancing a lying 
defence may be in most cases. 163 Even those who remain mute in the dock are expected 
to play their part, by entering a valid plea and standing their trial without disrupting the 
proceedings. 164 These are admittedly rather minimalist standards of ethical propriety, and 
perhaps there is not a great deal more to be said about criminal defendants ’ integrity per 
se. Like lay witnesses of fact more generally, who are also often reluctant and sometimes 
unwilling conscripts in criminal proceedings, the duties of citizenship (at least as liberals 
generally conceive them) may be largely confi ned to turning up to court, speaking when 
spoken to, and telling the truth as the witness believes it. The fact that common law crimi-
nal trial procedure seems to have grown out of a pervasive distrust of witnesses 165 tends to 
betray an institutionalised lack of confi dence that even these minimalist reciprocal duties 
of citizenship will be discharged with integrity. 
 Is the position of complainants and victims any different in this regard to that of 
bystander witnesses ? The prevailing view, bolstered by human rights law and several dec-
ades of victim-centred policy-making, 166 is that it is, or at any rate ought to be. What, then, 
would integrity require of victims ’ participation in criminal proceedings, over and above 
every witness ’ duty to tell the truth ? This is diffi cult terrain. One might reasonably expect 
enhanced rights of victim participation to be balanced by additional responsibilities. On 
the other hand, victims of crime are often emotionally vulnerable and are at risk of second-
ary victimisation through insensitive offi cial processing. Perhaps the system itself should 
underwrite the integrity of their participation, at the same time as meeting their needs 
for support and information. Here, we can do no more than pose the question for further 
refl ection and discussion. 
 Jurors are likewise conscripts to criminal proceedings, but in other respects represent 
a special case. Jurors are laypeople, but they also partly constitute the judicial tribunal 
and serve as the embodiment of the community in microcosm. The jury ’ s special, indeed 
 sacred , responsibility of judgment echoes down the centuries. 167 It is plausible to think that 
the jury ’ s pivotal role in a matter of such pre-eminent public importance as determin-
ing  liability to criminal conviction and punishment might impose special  responsibilities, 
even though jury service is mandatory for those selected. John Jackson pursues this line of 
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argument in  Chapter 12 , to reach conclusions challenging conventional wisdom. Criminal 
juries deliberate and decide collectively, but  individual conscience plays an important role 
in the common law theory of jury trial, especially in North America where unanimous 
verdicts are still the norm and the  ‘ hold out ’ juror is something of a cultural icon. 168 Juries 
cannot be described as bearing  ‘ professional ’ responsibility for their conduct in crimi-
nal trial proceedings, but the role of juror in a criminal case certainly does bring with it 
institutionally-defi ned as well as personal ethical responsibilities. For example, juries are 
required to deliberate in secret, and in England and Wales it is a contempt of court pun-
ishable by imprisonment to betray the secrets of the juryroom, even after proceedings 
are concluded. 169 Still, ought implies can. Any existing or putative obligation on jurors to 
deliberate in a particular fashion, or to report the process or outcome of their delibera-
tions in a particular way (with or without published  ‘ reasons ’ ), must be consistent with 
the (bounded) cognitive competence of human beings and the psychological dynamics of 
group decision-making. Personal and professional integrity is only a meaningful practical 
ideal whilst it remains on a human scale. It would be fatuous to criticise juries, or any other 
criminal process actors or agencies, for failing to live up to a supererogatory standard of 
integrity modelled on sainthood or superhuman cognition. 
 5. Promoting Integrity 
 The purpose of this book is to kick-start a methodologically sophisticated conversation 
about the  ‘ integrity ’ of criminal process, and to make signifi cant contributions towards its 
development across a range of familiar, and some less familiar, topics and issues. As befi ts 
an exploratory study of this nature, we make no pretentions to comprehensiveness, nor do 
we offer any fi rm conclusions in drawing this Introduction to a close. Having elucidated the 
concept of integrity and sketched out a preliminary taxonomy of criminal process applica-
tions, it is high time that we allowed the individual contributors to speak for themselves. 
 Some of the following chapters are primarily critically descriptive and diagnostic of 
shortcomings in contemporary criminal process. Others attempt to draw more program-
matic lessons from defi cient policies or practices, offering concrete proposals for proce-
dural reforms calculated to promote integrity in criminal adjudication. Numerous pressure 
points, obscurities and blemishes in the evolving jurisprudence of integrity are identifi ed 
along the way, informed by comparative legal scholarship. Integrity provides a methodo-
logically well-appointed meeting place for vigorous, pluralistic debate encompassing a rich 
diversity of theoretical approaches and perspectives. Severally, and in collective synergy, the 
essays comprising this collection demonstrate both the heuristic value and the normative 
potential of refocusing criminal process through the lens of integrity. 
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